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Abstract
A classic example of a privately created interbank payments system was operated
by the Suffolk Bank of New England (1825–58). Known as the Suffolk Banking
System, it was the nation’s ﬁrst regionwide net-clearing system for bank notes.
While it operated, notes of all New England banks circulated at par throughout the
region. Some have concluded from this experience that unfettered competition in
the provision of payments services can produce an efficient payments system. But
another look at the history of the Suffolk Banking System questions this conclu-
sion. The Suffolk Bank earned extraordinary proﬁts, and note-clearing may have
been a natural monopoly. There is no consensus in the literature about whether
unfettered operation of markets with natural monopolies produces an efficient
allocation of resources.
This study was originally published in the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s
Review (May/June 1998, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 105–16).
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.Should the Federal Reserve maintain its strong presence
in the U.S. payments system? Or should the Federal Re-
serve exit and allow the market to produce its own mech-
anism for making payments? While U.S. history is replete
with examples of payments systems that appear inefficient
and suggest a role for government, some recent research
on payments systems in the United States argues that pri-
vate markets are capable of producing safe and efficient
payments arrangements.
The classic, often-cited example of a privately created
andwell-functioningpaymentssystemistheSuffolkBank-
ingSystemthatexistedinNewEnglandbetween1825and
1858. (See, for example, Whitney 1878, Lake 1947, Red-
lich 1947, and Calomiris and Kahn 1996.) The Suffolk
BankofBostonoperated theﬁrstregionwide note-clearing
system in the United States. A result of the System was
that the notes of all New England banks circulated at par
throughout the region. The System’s achievements have
led some (Lake 1947, p. 206, and Calomiris and Kahn
1996, p. 795) to conclude that unfettered competition in
the provision of payments services can—and, in the ab-
sence of government intervention, likely will—produce an
efficient payments system. In this study, we argue that a
closer examination of the history of the Suffolk Banking
System calls into question this conclusion.
Before the Civil War, U.S. paper money consisted al-
most entirely of state banknotes—liabilities of the bank of
issue that were redeemable in specie on demand. Locally,
banknotes could be exchanged at par because they were
redeemable on demand. But once they circulated beyond
the community of the bank of issue, the notes typically
were exchanged at a discount.
In the normal course of business, virtually every bank
received the notes of other banks, a fact that is apparent
from the balance sheets of individual banks during this pe-
riod.Forexample,inMaineandMassachusetts,98percent
of all individual bank balance sheets show the bank hold-
ing notes of other banks. In New York and Pennsylvania,
the fraction is between 85 and 90 percent.
1 Thus, during
this period, banks had a substantial need to clear obliga-
tions among themselves.
In the mid-1820s, the Suffolk Bank created in New En-
gland an arrangement for banknote clearing that, at the
time, was unique in the United States. The Suffolk Bank
started a net-clearing system for banknotes. The Suffolk
System operated as follows: Members of the System were
required to keep an interest-free deposit at Suffolk (or at
one of the other Boston member banks). Suffolk then ac-
cepted and net-cleared all the banknotes its members de-
posited at par. By the early 1830s, most banks in New En-
gland had become members, and because of Suffolk’s par-
clearing policy, notes issued by members of the System
were exchanged at par throughout the region.
What is most remarkable about the Suffolk Bank is that
for more than 25 years, it earned extraordinary proﬁts and
was the only net-clearer of banknotes in New England.
Why was Suffolk so proﬁtable? And why did it take so
long for anotherprovider to enter the market?Our answers
to these questions are based on Suffolk’s having beneﬁted
from large economies of scale and scope and from ﬁnding
ways, including some help from government, to protect its
market share.
We ﬁnd, therefore, that the Suffolk Banking System
may not support the case for a laissez-faire approach to the
payments system. The history of the Suffolk Banking Sys-
tem suggests that note clearing is a natural monopoly. And
there is no consensus in the literature about whether or not
the unfettered operation of markets in the presence of nat-
ural monopolies will produce an efficient resource alloca-
tion.
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We proceed as follows. In the next section, we present
the history of the Suffolk Bank as it evolved from an ordi-
nary Boston bank into a note-clearing bank for all New
England.Then,wedocumenttheSuffolkBank’sextraordi-
nary proﬁts by showing that it was more proﬁtable than
any other bank in New England during the period that the
Suffolk Banking System was in operation, and we argue
that the Suffolk Bank had a monopoly on the note-clearing
business in New England. Following this, we interpret the
Suffolk Banking System’s history, and we suggest that the
note-clearing business may have been a natural monopoly.
We also suggest ways that the Suffolk Bank was able to
maintain its extraordinary proﬁts for so many years before
a new entrant was able to drive it out of business. In the
concluding section, we draw some lessons from the Suf-
folk Banking System and recommend further lines of re-
search.
The History and Evolution
of the Suffolk Banking System
Origins, 1818–25
Before the Civil War, virtually the entire circulating medi-
um of the United States consisted of privately issued bank-
notes. These notes were issued primarily by state banks
thatoperatedaccordingtoprovisionsofthechartergranted
by the state in which they were located. For the most part,
banknoteswereredeemableinspecieondemand,although
penalties for nonredemption were often minimal.
By the early 1800s, the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts had chartered several banks located not only in Bos-
ton, but also in other parts of Massachusetts and in the
province of Maine. The banks of Boston soon became
concerned about the quantity of country banknotes (also
known as foreign money) circulating in Boston (Redlich
1947, pp. 67–68). The banks thought that the extensive
circulation of country banknotes was limiting their bank-
note business and reducing their proﬁts.
In 1803, the Boston banks agreed to stop accepting for-
eign money from their customers in an attempt to increase
thebanks’shareoftotalBostonnotecirculation.Theresult
of this collusion, however, was much different from what
the banks of Boston expected. Instead of driving country
banknotes out of circulation, the take-no-notes policy led
others(knownasbanknotebrokers)totakeupthebusiness
of buying and redeeming country banknotes. After 1803,
a person in Boston who received a country banknote could
sell it to one of the city’s brokers. The brokers made a
proﬁt by buying notes at a discount and transporting them
back to the banks of issue for full redemption in specie.
Consequently, despite the boycott by the city banks, coun-
try banks were still successful at getting their notes to cir-
culate in Boston. According to Mullineaux (1987, p. 887),
between 1812 and 1844, well over half the notes circulat-
ing in Boston were country banknotes.In time, the success of the note-brokering business (and
the lack of success in driving country banknotes out of
circulation) led some Boston banks to reconsider their
policy of not accepting foreign money. Indeed, the Boston
banks established their own note-brokering operations
some time after 1804, and the discount on country bank-
notes was driven down to 3 percent in Boston (Lake 1947,
p. 184).
In 1814,the NewEngland Bank (ofBoston) introduced
animportantmodiﬁcationinnote-brokeringarrangements.
The New England Bank followed the strategy of purchas-
ing the notes of country banks and allowing country banks
to redeem them at the market rate of discount if they kept
a permanent, non–interest-bearing deposit with the New
England Bank. The activities of the New England Bank
andothernotebrokersdrovetheaveragediscountoncoun-
try banknotes down to 1 percent by 1818.
In 1818, the Suffolk Bank became the seventh bank to
be chartered in Boston. Shortly after starting operations,
Suffolk entered the note-brokering business. Suffolk’s
note-brokering activity was much like the New England
Bank’s.Suffolkboughtcountrybanknotesfrommerchants,
individuals, and other banks at a discount. Suffolk then
permitted a country bank to repurchase its notes at the
same discount paid by Suffolk—on two conditions: One
was that the country bank maintain a permanent, non–in-
terest-bearing deposit of $5,000 with the Suffolk Bank.
Theother was that thecountry bankmaintain an additional
non–interest-bearingdepositasaredemptionfund.Suffolk
sent the notes of nonparticipating country banks—country
banks that refused to make such deposits—home for full
redemption.
Shortly after Suffolk entered the market for country
banknotes, the discount on country banknotes declined
from 1 percent to 0.5 percent. Because Suffolk’s competi-
tors were attracting most of the business (by 1820 only a
handfulofcountrybankswereholdingpermanentdeposits
with Suffolk), Suffolk began to question the value of this
business. By the end of that year, Suffolk decided to end
the purchase of notes of nonparticipating banks. Suffolk
found that the cost of returning notes of nonparticipating
banks was not much less than the discount at which the
notes were purchased. Competition had made note broker-
ing hardly proﬁtable (Redlich 1947, p. 72).
In April 1824, Suffolk devised a new strategy for deal-
ing with country banknotes. Suffolk formed a coalition
with the six other Boston banks to export country bank-
notes, with the goal of eliminating foreign money from the
city of Boston. Each coalition member contributed be-
tween $30,000 and $60,000 for a total of $300,000. This
fund was to be used by Suffolk to purchase country bank-
notes at “the same or less discount than the New England
Bank, or other banks in Boston, received it, and should
send it home for redemption” (Whitney 1878, p. 15). Such
purchases were to continue indeﬁnitely until country notes
ceased to circulate in Boston. As with earlier attempts to
drive foreign money out of Boston, this attempt was also
unsuccessful.
The System in Operation, 1825–58
The failure of its note-presentment strategy eventually led
to the end of the coalition among Boston banks, but not
the Suffolk Bank’s role in the foreign money business. In-
deed, the Suffolk Bank was soon to become the dominant
player in this market. In May of 1825, the coalition of city
banks, having all but given up on driving country bank-
notes out of Boston, suggested that Suffolk allow other
banks to deposit all their country banknotes with Suffolk,
which would establish a system to net-clear the banknotes
it received. No longer would Suffolk merely buy country
banknotes in order to send them back to the issuing bank
for redemption. Instead, Suffolk would accept and clear at
par all country banknotes that participating banks chose to
deposit. By 1826, the city banks had withdrawn from the
coalition, and most had become members of the Suffolk
Bank’s note-clearing business, the Suffolk Banking Sys-
tem (Suffolk Bank 1826; Mullineaux 1987, p. 890).
The Suffolk Bank’s note-clearing business was similar
inmanywaystoitsoldnote-brokeringbusiness.Asbefore,
toparticipateinthe system,acountrybankhadtomaintain
a permanent, non–interest-bearing deposit with Suffolk or
with another Boston member of the Suffolk Banking Sys-
tem: For each $100,000 of capital, the bank had to hold
$2,000 on deposit. And as before, a country bank had to
maintain an additional non–interest-bearing deposit that
was, on average, sufficient to redeem the bank’s notes re-
ceived by the Suffolk Banking System. Boston banks had
to hold only a permanent, non–interest-bearing deposit.
This deposit was initially set at $30,000 but was gradually
reduced to $5,000.
A major innovation was associated with this new ar-
rangement. Banknotes were cleared by netting the ac-
counts of participating banks. Prior to this time, no net-
clearing system for banknotes had been established in the
United States.
3 For example, the (Second) Bank of the
United States, which dealt heavily in the notes of state
banks, practiced gross-clearing, simply presenting each
state bank’s notes for redemption in specie. In addition,
Suffolk offered loans—in effect, overdraft privileges—to
members of the System. As we will argue, these inno-
vations made the business attractive to all participating
banks and ultimately very proﬁtable.
The netting of banknotes worked as follows: Each day,
the notes deposited by participating banks at Suffolk were
sorted, and the following day, the net amount was posted
to the account of the appropriate bank. The notes of non-
participating banks were sent to the issuing bank for re-
demption as quickly as possible.
The process of net-clearing had value to Suffolk Bank-
ing System members because it lowered the cost of re-
deeming banknotes. Because fewer notes had to travel
back to the issuing bank for redemption, less specie had to
be physically shipped among banks at a time when such
shipment was relatively costly.
The net-clearing of banknotes opened up another busi-
ness to Suffolk. Suffolk became a major lender to other
banks. As a net-clearer, Suffolk offered the analog of over-
draft privileges (at a price). Moreover, by holding member
bank deposits and clearing member banknotes, Suffolk
could establish strong relationships with banks and likely
had an advantage over other potential lenders in monitor-
ing banks’ activities. In short, we think that Suffolk was
able to exploit economies of scope in combining its clear-
ing and lending activities.
By the end of 1825, Suffolk had to make some adjust-
ments to its business. Because Suffolk had more than
$1,183 in losses due to deﬁciencies (counterfeit and irre-deemable banknotes), it entered into a special agreement
with the head of its foreign money department. “[I]n con-
sideration of $1,050 per annum, in addition to his regular
salary, he should give bonds to indemnify the bank for all
deﬁciencies,counterfeits,mutilatedoruncurrentbillsinhis
department”(Whitney1878,p.18).Thisagreement,while
modiﬁed over time, lasted for the life of the business. The
agreement is of some signiﬁcance in the history of the Suf-
folk Bank, because it indicates that Suffolk paid to shed
muchoftheriskassociatedwithitsday-to-dayclearingop-
erations.
In its early stages, the Suffolk Banking System was rel-
atively small in both its clearing and its lending activities.
By the end of 1825, the Suffolk Bank was receiving about
$2 million a month in country banknotes. This volume of
note clearing was dwarfed by the Suffolk Bank’s later ac-
tivities. For instance, the Suffolk Bank cleared $9 million
a month in 1841, $20 million a month in 1851, and more
than $30 million a month by 1858 (Trivoli 1979, pp. 14,
21).To putthese numbersin perspective:Suffolk’s month-
ly clearing in 1825 amounted to approximately one-half of
the stock of notes in circulation in Massachusetts; in 1841
and 1851, it was equal to the entire stock of notes circulat-
ing in Massachusetts; and in 1858, it was slightly less than
one-and-a-half times the stock of notes circulating in Mas-
sachusetts.
Duringitsﬁrstyearsasanet-clearer,Suffolkearnedrel-
atively low proﬁts from this role. Until 1833, Suffolk’s
dividends [which are routinely used as a measure of prof-
its, for reasons given by Calomiris and Kahn (1996)] were
no higher than those of an average bank in either Boston
or Massachusetts. According to Redlich (1947, p. 75), the
earnings from note clearing were so low initially that “the
organization was in danger of being discarded by about
1830.”
By the early 1830s, however, the Suffolk Banking Sys-
tem’smembershiphadgrowndramatically.By1836,close
to 300 banks—the vast majority of banks in New En-
gland—were members of the Suffolk Banking System.
And while participation in the System was voluntary—
members did receive the beneﬁts we have mentioned—
state governments also created some additional incentives
to join the System. In 1842, a Vermont law gave a substan-
tial tax advantage to banks that were Suffolk Banking
Systemmembers.AndaMassachusettslawpassedin1843
prohibited banks from paying out the notes of other banks,
whichalsogavebanksincentivestoclearnotesthroughthe
Suffolk Banking System.
The increase in the size of the Suffolk Banking System
eventually turned into a healthy increase in proﬁts for the
Suffolk Bank. Before 1825—that is, before the Suffolk
Bank got into the note-clearing business—its annual divi-
dend averaged 6.5 percent. Between 1826 and 1830, it fell
slightly to 6.0 percent. Between 1830 and 1840, however,
Suffolk’s average annual dividend jumped to 7.4 percent.
Between 1840 and 1850, the average annual dividend was
more than 8 percent, and between 1850 and 1855, it was
10 percent.
4 Moreover, in 1839, Suffolk paid out of its
growingsurplusaonetime33.3percentdividend(Whitney
1878, p. 41). [In 1852, Suffolk once again accumulated a
largesurplus,but accordingtoWhitney(1878, pp.41–42),
the surplus was not divided among the stockholders be-
cause it was stolen by the bank’s bookkeeper.] As we dis-
cuss below, Suffolk’s proﬁts were impressive not only rel-
ative to its past performance, but also relative to all other
banks in New England.
Demise, 1858–60
While Suffolk’s earlier attempts at note brokering and note
presentment were disappointments, its note-clearing busi-
nessprovedverypopularandproﬁtable.TheSuffolkBank-
ing System grew and prospered for more than three de-
cades. The political situation changed in the early 1850s,
however, and a competitor emerged that, in a surprisingly
short period, drove Suffolk out of the note-clearing busi-
ness.
Opposition to the Suffolk System developed soon after
Suffolk started its note-clearing business, but some 30
years passed before another note-clearing business
emerged (Lake 1947, pp. 192–93). In 1826, a convention
of country banks met in Boston to discuss a coordinated
effort to oppose Suffolk, but no agreement was reached.
Ten years later, a group of country banks opposed to Suf-
folk’s control of the market tried to obtain a charter for a
new bank for the sole purpose of establishing a note-clear-
ing system that would compete directly with the Suffolk
Banking System. Members of the group argued that Suf-
folk was essentially charging too much for the services
rendered, and they wanted an alternative. They proposed
that a new note-clearing bank be established and that the
stock of this new venture be held only by member banks,
so that all members of the system could share in the prof-
its. But opponents of the new bank prevailed.
5 The oppo-
nents argued that there did not appear to be a need for an-
other note-clearing business, that the Suffolk System was
working well, and that until the country banks acted as a
group to request another, no action should be taken. Such
a concerted request was not forthcoming until almost 20
years later (Lake 1947, pp. 193, 195).
In the late 1840s, Suffolk started to shift (or attempt to
shift)moreofitscostsandriskstomemberbanks.In1849,
Suffolk adopted the policy of refusing to receive notes for
redemption “unless they were assorted into two packages,
one containing Boston bills only, and the other issues of
other banks” (Whitney 1878, p. 41). Suffolk thereby shift-
edsomeofitsoperatingcostsontomemberbanks.Howev-
er, much more signiﬁcant were three events related to the
Suffolk Bank’s net-clearing business.
Throughout the operation of the Suffolk System, Suf-
folk had sent all Rhode Island notes to the Merchants’
Bank of Providence, which then cleared them with the
RhodeIslandbanks.In1852,Suffolkimposedanewmini-
mum charge of 50 cents per $1,000 of country money
received from the Merchants’ Bank. This action induced
the Rhode Island banks to revive the proposal for the for-
mation of a competitor to Suffolk whose stock would be
owned by member banks (Lake 1947, p. 193). This pro-
posal did not take off immediately, but it did shortly there-
after.
It was also the case that Suffolk had always been ex-
posed to some default risk on the notes it held between the
time the notes were deposited and the time they cleared.
Suffolk was even potentially exposed to similar risks on
notes that were deposited by System members with other
Boston banks (Whitney 1878, p. 46). In 1853, the Ex-
change Bank (of Boston) refused to redeem the notes of
twoConnecticutbankswhosenotesithadoriginallytaken.The Exchange Bank had deposited the notes with Suffolk,
and the issuers of the notes had defaulted. As a result, Suf-
folk reminded other Boston banks of its long-held policy
“that thenotes of countrybanks wouldbe received onlyon
condition that all notes would be redeemed by the agent
banks” (Lake 1947, p. 194). A dispute with the Exchange
Bank ensued in which the Exchange Bank claimed that it
could not agree to Suffolk’s terms, because guaranteeing
theliabilitiesofathirdbankwasillegal.Suffolk’sresponse
was to notify the correspondents of the Exchange Bank
that it would not accept their notes in the future. As a
result, at least some of the Exchange Bank’s correspon-
dents transferred their deposits to Suffolk. The Exchange
Bank was then soon to become an important supporter of
a Suffolk competitor (Lake 1947, p. 194).
Finally, in 1853, Suffolk announced that it would re-
ceive no foreign money after noon each day “because the
labor of sorting the bills was so great that the clerks . . .
had to work late at night to complete their labors” (Lake
1947, p. 195). In response, the other Boston banks threat-
ened to withdraw their deposits with Suffolk and form a
new bank unless Suffolk took country notes until 2 p.m.
They argued that “the Suffolk Bank was obtaining proﬁts
large enough to enable it to employ enough clerks to han-
dle all country bills received” (Lake 1947, p. 195). On this
issue, Suffolk conceded.
In 1855, a charter was granted to the Bank of Mutual
Redemption(BMR).Thisbankwasintendedtoclearnotes
and make loans to member banks—as Suffolk did—and
moreover, its stock was to be owned entirely by banks that
were members of the system. Apparently, the support of
the Exchange Bank was instrumental in the granting of a
charter to the BMR (Redlich 1947, p. 75).
Despite the support of the Exchange Bank and the
Rhode Island banks for a Suffolk competitor, the BMR
had difficulty raising enough capital to begin operations.
Indeed, it did not succeed in raising the necessary capital
to open its operations until 1858. Nevertheless, when the
BMR opened, 143 banks (roughly half the banks in New
England) were stockholders (Dewey 1910, p. 95).
The BMR operated much as the Suffolk System did.
The BMR required the maintenance of a permanent de-
posit and a clearing balance. But unlike Suffolk, the BMR
paid interest on its deposits at a rate of 3 percent per year.
The reaction of Suffolk to the entry of the BMR into
the note-clearing business was at ﬁrst combative. Suffolk
initially intended to ﬁght the BMR and began by refusing
to redeem the notes of BMR members through the BMR.
Suffolk’s argument in doing so was that the BMR held no
deposit with Suffolk and, hence, that banks clearing
through the BMR were not entitled to the same treatment
as SuffolkSystem members. Hence, notesissued by mem-
bers of the BMR and received by Suffolk were sent to the
issuing bank for immediate redemption.
In its opening salvos with the BMR, Suffolk was sup-
ported neither by the other Boston banks nor by the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts. On October 11, 1858, the
BMR was admitted to the Boston clearinghouse. “On the
same day the [Massachusetts] Bank Commissioners . . .
formally advised the Suffolk Bank . . . that it should either
continue to receive bills of all the banks which had with-
drawn their deposits and to present them at the Bank of
Mutual Redemption or it should decline to receive from its
depositors the bills of such banks” (Lake 1947, pp. 200–
201). The lack of support from the Boston banks and the
attitudeofthestatebankcommissionersapparentlyaverted
an open ﬁght between Suffolk and the BMR.
Suffolk’s next step was quite different. On October 16,
1858,Suffolkannouncedthatitwouldwithdrawaltogether
fromtheforeignmoneybusiness.Thisannouncementdoes
not appear to have been an idle threat, because Suffolk did
leave the business in 1860. And Suffolk’s proposed with-
drawal from its note-clearing activities apparently was a
threat with teeth. Because the BMR could not handle any-
thing like the entire volume of note clearing in New En-
gland, “the bank presidents asked the Suffolk Bank to con-
tinue receiving country money until February 28, 1859.
They were met with a brusque refusal. Finally, a compro-
mise was reached by which the banks were to make ar-
rangements individually with the Suffolk or Mutual
Redemption bank. Under the terms made by the Suffolk
Bank country money would be received for a charge of
twenty-ﬁvecentsper$1,000”(Lake1947,pp.202–3).The
50 cents per $1,000 that Suffolk charged the Merchants’
BankofProvidencein1853thusappearstohave exhibited
a large monopoly-pricing element. Indeed, even the 25
cents per $1,000 charge seems high relative to Suffolk’s
average costs, which, according to Whitney (1878, pp.
53–54), were 10 cents per $1,000 cleared.
This was the end of the Suffolk Banking System and
the beginning of the BMR. The operation of the BMR
apparently beneﬁted the country banks, whose note circu-
lation rose (while that of the Boston banks fell) from 1858
to 1859. The BMR, however, was not proﬁtable, and it
ceased to pay interest on deposits when Suffolk halted its
own note-clearing operations in 1860. The BMR did not
pay its ﬁrst dividend until October 1860 and then only at
the (semiannual) rate of 2 percent.
The Suffolk Bank’s Proﬁtability
Rolnick and Weber (1998) use annual data on bank divi-
dendsandpricesofBostonbankstockstodocumentsever-
al facts about the proﬁts of the Suffolk Bank relative to
those of other Massachusetts banks. In this section, we
summarize those results and present evidence that the Suf-
folk Bank appears to have been a monopolist in the provi-
sion of note-clearing services.
RolnickandWeber(1998)showthattheSuffolkBank’s
proﬁtsappearfairlysimilartothoseofotherMassachusetts
banks through 1833. From 1834 until 1858, however, the
Suffolk Bank was consistently more proﬁtable than any
other Massachusetts bank. Several kinds of evidence sup-
port these conclusions. One kind is aggregate evidence on
dividend payments. Rolnick and Weber (1998) show that
through 1833, the Suffolk Bank paid dividends at a rate
comparable to theaverage (or themedian) of thosepaid by
other banks in Massachusetts. However, from 1834 to
1858, Suffolk consistently paid dividends at a rate that was
about two percentage points higher than the typical rates
paid either by other large Boston banks or by Massachu-
setts banks in general. This aggregate evidence is support-
ed by a bank-by-bank comparison of dividend rates over
the period from 1834 to 1858. This comparison indicates
that althoughthereweresomeyearsinwhichasmallnum-
ber of banks paid dividends at rates equal to or even slight-
ly higher than those paid by the Suffolk Bank, no bank did
this consistently. Further, those banks whose dividendsoccasionally rivaled the Suffolk Bank’s were almost ex-
clusively small, non-Boston banks.
Rolnick and Weber (1998) also look at prices of the
stock of Boston banks during this period. These data come
from Martin (1886), who compiled the yearly high and
lowstockpricesofbankstocksintheBostonstockmarket.
For each year from 1834 to 1858, with only the exceptions
of 1839 and 1840, the lowest price paid for shares of Suf-
folk Bank stock was higher than the highest price paid for
the shares of any other bank in Boston.
These ﬁndings allow three important points to be made
with respect to the Suffolk Banking System. First, to bor-
row Whitney’s (1878, p. 41) phrase, “the [Suffolk] busi-
ness was very remunerative.” Second, the Suffolk Bank
was acting alone in the note-clearing business, rather than
as the representative of a larger coalition of Boston banks
as Calomiris and Kahn (1996, p. 794) argue. The Suffolk
Bank routinely earned higher proﬁts than other large
banks. And when the Suffolk Bank ﬁrst began to earn un-
usual proﬁts in 1833, there was no corresponding increase
in the proﬁts either of large Boston banks or of Massachu-
setts banks in general.
6 Third, Suffolk’s proﬁts were al-
ways high. Thus, its high average proﬁts cannot be viewed
as compensation for some unusual risks it was taking.
We now present evidence that the Suffolk Bank had
substantial market power and may have been a monopolist
in the provision of note-clearing services, at least during
the period from 1834 to 1858. We begin by establishing
that the Suffolk Bank was by far the largest holder of in-
terbank deposits.
7We show this in Charts 1 and 2. In Chart
1, we show the Suffolk Bank’s share of the interbank de-
positmarket.From1830to1853,the SuffolkBankconsis-
tently held between 30 and 55 percent of all “due to other
banks” held by Massachusetts banks. In Chart 2, we plot
the ratio of the Suffolk Bank’s holdings of “due to’s” to
the next-largest holdings of “due to’s” by a Massachusetts
bank. The scale on the vertical axis in this chart is in terms
of powers of 2, so that zero indicates that Suffolk’s hold-
ings are equal to those of the next-largest bank, 1 indicates
that Suffolk’s holdings are twice as large as those of the
next-largestbank,andsoforth.Fromthischart,weseethat
inmostyears,theSuffolkBank’sholdingsofsuchdeposits
were at least twice as large as those of the next-largest
bank.
Next, we show that the identity of the banks that ranked
belowSuffolkintermsofthevolumeofinterbankdeposits
changed frequently over time. We show this in the accom-
panying table, where we list the banks that ranked among
the top ﬁve in terms of the volume of “due to’s” annually
from 1825 until 1860. As expected from Chart 2, the Suf-
folk Bank virtually always has the largest amount of “due
to’s.” However, no other bank consistently held a large
shareoftheinterbankdepositmarket.Upto1840,theNew
EnglandBankandtheStateBankwerethebanksthatmost
frequently ranked in the top ﬁve behind the Suffolk Bank
intermsoftheshareoftheinterbankdepositmarket.How-
ever, beginning in 1840, those two banks were replaced in
the rankings by the Merchants’ Bank of Boston and the
Globe Bank, and after 1850, the Bank of Commerce dis-
placed the Globe Bank in the rankings.
We have already argued that a bank engaged in net-
clearing on a large scale might easily exploit economies
of scope by also acting as an interbank lender. Rolnick
and Weber (1998) document that the history of the Suf-
folk Bank is indeed consistent with this idea. Between
1833 and 1858, the Suffolk Bank consistently held at least
between 15 and 20 percent of all interbank loans. More-
over, the large increase in the Suffolk Bank’s proﬁts co-
incided with a substantial increase in its position as an
interbank lender. Indeed, in 1833, the Suffolk Bank held
three times as many interbank loans as any other Massa-
chusetts bank. In contrast, in 1831, the Suffolk Bank had
interbank loans approximately equal to those of several
other banks. This fact clearly suggests that the Suffolk
Bank’s proﬁts derived, at least in part, from the exploita-
tion of economies of scope in interbank lending.
An Interpretation
In this section, we attempt to interpret the facts we have
just summarized and to answer the question, Why did it
take over 25 years for another New England bank to enter
Suffolk’s market? We begin the interpretation with an ob-
servation that has been made by many other historians of
the Suffolk Banking System (Whitney 1878, Lake 1947,
Redlich 1947, Bodenhorn 1998): Suffolk was a monop-
olist. We also think that Suffolk was a relatively sophisti-
cated monopolist. Its pricing practices involved a two-part
tariff from 1826 on and even more elaborate nonlinear
pricing schemes (and price discrimination) at later points.
ThesepricingpracticesseemtohavemadeSuffolkvery
effective at garnering surplus. The data indicate that while
Suffolk’s proﬁts rose dramatically in 1833, this was not
true for the proﬁts of other banks in Boston or elsewhere
inMassachusetts.Thedataarethereforeconsistentwiththe
notion that whatever surplus accrued to members of the
SuffolkBankingSystemwasprimarilycapturedbySuffolk
itself.
Moreover, we think that the Suffolk Banking System
was a natural monopoly. It is not hard to construct argu-
ments that there are economies of scale in net-clearing and
that these can be captured fully only by a system with a
single net-clearer. It is also not hard to construct arguments
that the agent doing net-clearing has cost advantages as a
providerofoverdrafts andasaninterbanklender. Thus,we
think thereis astrong presumption thatSuffolk wasable to
exploit both economies of scale and economies of scope in
its activities.And indeed, the SuffolkBank became unusu-
ally proﬁtable only as it began to fully exploit both types
of economies.
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This history of the Suffolk Banking System is, of
course, fully consistent with this view. Suffolk was not an
unusually proﬁtable bank until it became a large enough
player in both note clearing and interbank lending. And at
least equally telling is the observation that Suffolk was not
willing to split its market with the BMR. The failure of the
market to sustain two net-clearers is, in our minds, very
suggestive of natural monopoly.
We should emphasize at this point that the presence of
a monopoly—either natural or otherwise—in no way nec-
essarily implies that any economic inefficiencies were as-
sociatedwiththeoperationoftheSuffolkBankingSystem.
Indeed, as shown by Edlin, Epelbaum, and Heller (1998),
the presence of a monopolist that can engage in price dis-
crimination and levy two-part tariffs is often fully consis-
tent with Pareto efficiency.
In addition, if Suffolk was a natural monopoly, there is
anotherimportantquestion.IftheSuffolkexperimentwererepeated at another time and in another place, would we
expect the Suffolk outcome to be replicated? Or more gen-
erally, would we expect the market to produce an efficient
outcome? The answer to this general question can hardly
be an unequivocal yes. There are many reasons, some of
which are reviewed by Sharkey (1982), that the market
might not produce an efficient outcome in the presence of
anaturalmonopoly.Andevenanunchallengedmonopolist
with great powers of price discrimination and with the
power to engage in nonlinear pricing need not attain an
efficient allocation of resources under all cost conditions,
as noted by Edlin, Epelbaum, and Heller (1998).
In general, the ability of the market to produce an effi-
cient outcome with a natural monopoly depends strongly
on cost and demand conditions in the market and on the
relativestrategicpositionsofotherpotentialmarketpartici-
pants.
9 Thus, even if one views the Suffolk experience as
supportive of the notion that the free market can be an
efficient provider of payment services, we do not see that
one can conclude that the free market will lead to the effi-
cient provision of payment services under any possible
conﬁguration of market conditions.
All of this leaves us with two ﬁnal questions: How was
Suffolk able to deter the entry of a competitor until 1858?
And how was the BMR able to enter in 1858 and drive
Suffolk out of the note-clearing business?
With regard to the ﬁrst question, we think it is useful to
view the industrial organization of note clearing in New
England as the outcome of a game played between the
Suffolk Bank and potential rivals. Through the historical
accident of being asked by the other large Boston banks to
be the net-clearer, Suffolk was handed the position of the
incumbent in the industry. Several models of industry or-
ganization in the presence of a natural monopoly exist. Al-
though the underlying games in these models differ, a gen-
eral implication is that the incumbent monopolist will be
able to earn monopoly proﬁts over an extended period if it
enjoys some type of strategic advantage over potential en-
trants.
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One form of such a strategic advantage is some kind of
barrier to entry. In the case of the Suffolk Bank, one could
think of a barrier to entry as the cost that a potential entrant
would have to bear in trying to sign up banks for a rival
net-clearing network. These costs are sunk because they
would have to be borne by the potential entrant even if the
rival never actually entered the note-clearing business. Of
course, Suffolk would have already borne these costs, so
they would not be relevant to its decision regarding wheth-
er or not to continue in the business.
Another form of strategic advantage is the threat of
predatory pricing. In the case of the Suffolk Bank, preda-
tory pricing could have consisted of offering interest on
depositsshouldarivalhaveentered.Notethateventhough
Suffolkneverengagedinofferinginterestondeposits,such
a threat still could have been implied. The fact that we
have no record of such a threat may simply mean that the
impliedthreatwassuccessful.Inthatcase,offeringinterest
on deposits would have been out-of-equilibrium behavior
because entry by a rival would never have occurred.
With regard to the second question, about the BMR’s
entry, we think it is useful to continue to think in terms of
the game described above. From the viewpoint of the rel-
ativestrategicadvantagesinagamebetweenanincumbent
and potential entrants, the BMR was a potential entrant
unlike any existing bank because its charter permitted its
stock to be owned only by banks. In other words, the
BMR was a rival that would be owned by its customers.
This situation would change the nature of the game be-
cause now the rival would have a strategic position that
was different from that of previous potential challengers.
Its position might also be interpreted as lowering the sunk
costs faced by the potential entrant, because one bank
couldseeotherbanks’commitmentstojoiningthecompet-
ing system through their purchases of stock in the BMR.
Two other points are of interest with regard to the entry
of the BMR. One is Suffolk’s reaction, which ultimately
was to withdraw from the net-clearing business. This is
consistent with our interpretation of net-clearing as a natu-
ral monopoly. The other is what the BMR did with regard
to offering interest on deposits. When the BMR ﬁrst en-
tered the market, it offered interest on deposits. Once the
BMR had driven Suffolk out of the market, however, it
adopted Suffolk’s strategy of not paying interest on depos-
its. This is consistent with our interpretation of temporarily





of Massachusetts in 1818, evolved from an ordinary Bos-
ton bank into a note-clearing bank for all of New England.
We have documented that it earned extraordinary proﬁts
for over 25 years and that it had a monopoly in the inter-
bank deposit and loan markets. From this we have inferred
that it also had a monopoly on note clearing. Our interpre-
tation of Suffolk’s history suggests ways that Suffolk was
able to maintain its extraordinary proﬁts for so many years
and also suggests that the note-clearing business may have
been a natural monopoly. The latter observation is of some
importance because there is no consensus in the literature
aboutwhetheror nottheunfetteredoperationof marketsin
the presence of natural monopolies will produce an effi-
cient resource allocation.
Future research should focus on whether or not the Suf-
folk Banking System was truly unique. Some have argued
that a Suffolk-type system did not exist in other parts of
the country. We think it would be useful to better docu-
ment the types of note-clearing arrangements that existed
elsewhereto determinehowtheydiffered fromtheSuffolk
Banking System and, if they were different, to determine
what factors would account for the observed features of
different payments systems.
*This article is reprinted, with permission, from “Lessons From Financial History:
ProceedingsoftheTwenty-SecondAnnualEconomicPolicyConferenceoftheFederal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis,” a special issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Review (May/June 1998, vol. 80, no. 3, pp. 105–16). The article was edited for publi-
cation in the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review.
The authors thank the Baker Library, Harvard Business School, for the materials
provided from its Suffolk Bank Collection, and Ed Green, Jamie McAndrews, and
Randy Kroszner for their very constructive comments. The views expressed herein are
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minne-
apolis or the Federal Reserve System.
†Weber is also an adjunct professor of economics at the University of Minnesota.
1These percentages are based on individual bank balance sheet data available on
the Web at http://research.mpls.frb.fed.us/research/economists/wewproj.html.2For an example of a study that demonstrates how a Pareto-efficient equilibrium
can exist in a market with a monopolistic provider of one or more goods, see Edlin,
Epelbaum, and Heller 1998.
3There was net-clearing in other countries by this time, however. See, for example,
the discussion of note clearing in Scotland in Kroszner 1996.
4We do not think that the 1850–55 increase in dividends is attributable to changes
going on within the Suffolk Banking System. The California gold discoveries led to
some inﬂation. All short-term nominal interest rates in New England seem to have
risen at this time (Homer and Sylla 1991).
5According to Kroszner (1996), the request for a charter was tabled in the state
legislature by supporters of Suffolk.
6These observations also explain why Calomiris and Kahn (1996) do not ﬁnd the
Suffolk Banking System particularly proﬁtable; they incorrectly assume that the aver-
age annual dividend paid by the System was the average paid by all the large Boston
banks.
7Clearly, it was necessary for banks to hold deposits with a bank that was perform-
ing clearing services on their behalf.
8Of course, there may be economies of scale and scope only over certain ranges
of activity, as noted by Sharkey (1982). At some point, congestion costs may reverse
decreasing average costs.
9See Bagwell and Ramey 1996 for an interesting discussion of how even an en-
trenchedmonopolistwithalargeproductivecapacitycanlackthestrategicwherewithal
to deter entry.
10See, for example, the model in Dixit 1980 and Ware 1984 in which the incum-
bent enjoys the strategic advantage of being able to make a capacity commitment
before the potential entrant. In the Bagwell and Ramey (1996) reformulation of the
model, the strategic advantage goes to the potential entrant, however.
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The Top Five Banks in 1825–60
Name of Bank in Each Position*
Year             1st                     2nd                     3rd                    4th                    5th
1825              City                    New England           Other                      Union                  Tremont
1826              Suffolk               City                       New England      Tremont               Other
1827              Suffolk               City                       New England       Union                  Other
1828              Suffolk                New England           Union               Other                   State
1829              Suffolk               State                       New England         Union                 Other
1830              Suffolk               City                       State                      New England       Other
1831              Suffolk               New England           State                     Globe                   Other
1832              Suffolk               New England           Other               Union                  State
1833              Suffolk               Globe                  Other                State                    Other           
1834              Suffolk               State                   City                       Globe                  Merchants’
1835              Suffolk                Merchants’            Other                  New England        State
1836              Suffolk                Merchants’           Other                 State                  New England
1837              Suffolk               Merchants’          State                      New England        Other
1838              Suffolk                Globe                 Merchants’           New England        State
1839              Suffolk                Globe                 Merchants’             New England        Other
1840              Suffolk                Merchants’              Globe                     State                   Other
1841              Suffolk                Merchants’              Globe                     Other                   Other
1842              Suffolk                Merchants’              Globe                     Other                    State
1843              Suffolk                Merchants’              Globe                     State                  New England
1844              Suffolk                Merchants’              Globe                     Other                   New England
1845              Suffolk                Merchants’              Globe                     Other                   Other
1846              Suffolk                Merchants’              Globe                     Other                   State
1847              Suffolk                Merchants’              Globe                     State                 Other
1848              Suffolk                Merchants’              Globe                     Tremont                Other
1849              Suffolk                Merchants’              Globe                     New England      Tremont 
1850              Suffolk                Merchants’              Other                    New England        Commerce
1851              Suffolk                Merchants’              Commerce              Globe                   New England
1852              Suffolk                Commerce          Merchants’             Tremont               Exchange
1853              Suffolk                Merchants’              Commerce              Other                  Tremont
1854              Merchants’          Suffolk                    Commerce              Exchange             Globe
1855              Suffolk                Commerce           Merchants’             Other                   Other
1856              Suffolk                Merchants’              Commerce              Exchange             Globe
1857              Suffolk                Merchants’              Commerce              Tremont                Other
1858              Suffolk                BMR                       Merchants’           Commerce          Globe
1859              BMR                  Suffolk                    Merchants’             Other                   Commerce
1860              BMR                  Suffolk                    Commerce              Merchants’          Exchange
*All of the banks listed here were located in Boston.
Sources: See Rolnick and Weber 1998, Appendix, p. 15.Charts 1–2
Suffolk Bank's Share of the Interbank Deposit Market
Amounts of Interbank Deposits Held by Suffolk Bank
Compared to Those Held by Other Massachusetts Banks
Chart 1 Suffolk as a Percentage of All Massachusetts Banks
1826–61
Chart 2 Ratio of Suffolk to Next-Largest Massachusetts Bank
1826–60
Power of 2
Sources: Massachusetts bank condition reports cited in
Rolnick and Weber 1998, Appendix, p. 15
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